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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Freedom of Information Act1 (“FOIA”), a law that appears to 
be relatively straight-forward on its face, has generated a substantial 
amount of case law over the last forty-five years that clearly reflects the 
tension between the public’s right of access to government records and 
the government’s need to withhold records in order to protect national 
security interests, whether those interests pertain to classified or sensitive 
but unclassified information.  While the FOIA does not require a 
requester to cite a reason or purpose when submitting a FOIA request for 
government records,2 FOIA requesters will sometimes articulate reasons 
why they are requesting the records and those reasons may include the 
following: educational purposes, need for public debate on government 
actions and/or proposed actions, authorities for said government actions, 
notification to the public as to how the United States Government 
(“USG”) is spending taxpayer dollars, and/or fundamental principles of 
democracy.  On the other hand, there are those who place their lives on 
the line for national security reasons and those charged with protecting 
the United States who are concerned that releasing too much information 
places the nation’s security, its citizens, and those who defend the nation 
at risk. 
 
 
 
 
 1  Administrative Procedures Act [hereinafter “APA”] § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2015); The 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) was passed in 1966 pursuant to the APA of 1966, Pub. 
L. No. 89-487, 80 STAT. 250 (1966), which amended the APA of 1946, ch. 324, 60 STAT. 
238 (1946).  However, as initially drafted, the APA of 1966, § 3, 80 STAT. 250, placed the 
FOIA in Title 5 of the U.S.C., specifically 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1966), with the title of Public 
Information, availability.  Further, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 STAT. 54 (1967) amended the FOIA 
and placed the statute in its current location, specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
 2  See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(3)(A)(ii) (2015). 
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II. THE HISTORY BEHIND PRESIDENT LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON’S 
SIGNING OF THE FOIA 
In viewing the FOIA from today’s perspective, one could argue that 
the tension between public access to government records and protection 
of national security was clearly evident on July 4, 1966,3 the day 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the FOIA into law.  On more 
recent anniversaries of the FOIA’s date of enactment, commentators have 
discussed President Johnson’s (supposed) feelings about the FOIA and 
concluded that he was not in favor of it for multiple reasons.4  First, 
commentators note that President Johnson only issued a written 
statement, rather than having a formal bill signing ceremony.5  Further, 
there was no appointment annotation made to President Johnson’s daily 
calendar.6  Mr. Bill Moyers, former White House Press Secretary, 
bolstered the proposition that President Johnson was not in favor of the 
law when, as the guest speaker at the Twentieth Anniversary of the 
National Security Archive at George Washington University, he stated: 
I was there, as the White House press secretary, when 
President Lyndon Johnson signed the act on July 4, 1966; 
signed it with language that was almost lyrical – ‘With a deep 
sense of pride that the United States is an open society in 
which the people’s right to know is cherished and guarded.’ 
 
Well yes, but I knew LBJ [Lyndon Baines Johnson] had to be 
dragged kicking and screaming to the signing ceremony.  He 
hated the very idea of the Freedom of Information Act; hated 
the thought of journalists rummaging in government closets 
and opening government files; hated them challenging the 
official view of reality.  He dug in his heels and even 
threatened to pocket veto the bill after it reached the White 
House.7 
 
 3  The FOIA was signed into law on July 4, 1966 and took effect on July 4, 1967.  See 
Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966); see also and Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967). 
 4  See Ted Bridis, LBJ Loath to Approve Information Act in 1966, Feared the Disclosure 
of National Secrets, BOSTON.COM NEWS (July 4, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/nation 
/washington/articles/2006/07/04/lbj_loath_to_approve_information_act_in_1966; see also 
Thomas S. Blanton, Ed., Freedom of Information at 40, LBJ Refused Ceremony, Undercut 
Bill with Signing Statement, THE NAT’L SEC.  ARCHIVE GEO. WASH. UNIV. (2006), 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017), 
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194. 
 5  Bridis, supra note 4. 
 6  See President’s Daily Diary, July 4, 1966, 1963-1969, Gen FE 14-1, Access to 
Records, WHCF, LBJ Library; see also THOMAS S. BLANTON, ED., Freedom of Information 
at 40, LBJ Refused Ceremony, Undercut Bill with Signing Statement , Doc. 39, THE 
NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE GEO. WASH. UNIV. (2006), available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSA 
EBB/NSAEBB194.   
 7  Mr. Bill Moyers, Address at the Twentieth Anniversary of the National Security 
Archive: In the Kingdom of the Half-Blind (Dec. 9, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/anniversary/moyers.htm).  
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However, possibly the strongest evidence that President Johnson 
was not in favor of the FOIA may be the substantial changes made to the 
bill signing statement as initially drafted, the revised statements, the press 
release statement, and the bill signing statement with President Johnson’s 
signature.  As noted by Mr. Thomas S. Blanton, Director of The National 
Security Archive, “the signing statement includes more about the need to 
keep secrets than the urgency of openness.”8 
The National Security Archives has obtained numerous documents 
pertaining to the enactment of the FOIA from President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson’s Library and Museum.9  The documents include two 
marked drafts of the bill signing statement, both with handwritten edits, 
a press release statement (dated July 4, 1966), and a final bill signing 
statement with President Johnson’s signature.10  There are differences 
between all four documents; some more substantial than others.  Excerpts 
of the first draft bill signing statement (with no label), as originally typed, 
are as follows: 
This legislation implements a principle of paramount 
importance to our democratic system.  A democracy 
functions best when people have access to information about 
their government.  They must be able to ascertain the policies 
and rules by which departments and agencies operate.  
Mistakes should not be hidden by pulling the curtains of 
secrecy around a decision which can be revealed without 
injury to the public interest.  Good government functions best 
in the open, in the full light of day. 
 
At the same time, the welfare of the nation or the rights of 
individuals may require that some documents not be made 
available to the public.  As long as threats to peace exist, there 
must be military secrets.  A citizen must have the right to 
complain to his government and to give information in 
confidence…I sign this measure with a deep sense of pride 
that our nation, unlike some nations, values highly the right 
of the people to know how their government is operating.11 
Corresponding excerpts of the second draft bill signing statement 
(marked “Draft II”), as originally typed, show only slight modifications 
 
 8  Blanton, supra note 4. 
 9  Blanton, supra note 4.  
 10  See Statement by the President, Includes Variants, (includes variants: (1) Unsigned 
Draft; (2) Unsigned Draft; Draft II Annotated by LBJ himself, and (3) Annotated Draft with 
Handwritten Note from G.C., http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/Document% 
2031.pdf), Records of White House Offices, 1963–1969, White House Press Office Files, Box 
49, June 30, 1966 – July 15, 1966, PR 210a – PR 2134a, LBJ Library [hereinafter “Statement 
by the President 1963-1969”]; see also Thomas S. Blanton, Ed., Freedom of Information at 
40, LBJ Refused Ceremony, Undercut Bill with Signing Statement , THE NAT’L SEC. 
ARCHIVE, DOC. 31 (2006), available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/.  
 11  Statement by the President 1963-1969, supra note 10.   
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from the first draft when compared to the second draft.  The second 
draft’s corresponding excerpts are as follows: 
This legislation springs from one of our most essential 
principles:  a democracy works best when the people know 
what their government is doing.  They must have access to 
the policies and rules by which departments and agencies 
operate.  Government officials should not be able to pull 
curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed 
without injury to the public.  Good government functions best 
in the full light of day. 
 
At the same time, the welfare of the nation or the rights of 
individuals may require that some documents not be made 
available.  As long as threats to peace exist, for example, there 
must be military secrets, a citizen must be able in confidence 
to complain to his government and to provide information 
just as he is—and should be—free to confide in the press 
without fear of intimidation or reprisal…. 
I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the 
United States is an open society in which the decisions and 
policies—as well as the mistakes—of public officials are 
always subjected to the scrutiny and judgement [sic] of the 
people.12 
The Office of the White House Press Secretary issued a press release 
of the bill signed into law; however, it is not only different from the first 
and second drafts, but is also different from the bill signing statement that 
contains President Johnson’s signature.  The corresponding excerpts of 
the press release statement are as follows: 
This legislation springs from one of our most essential 
principles:  a democracy works best when the people have all 
the information that the security of the nation permits.  No 
one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around 
decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public 
interest. 
 
At the same time, the welfare of the Nation or the rights of 
individuals may require that some documents not be made 
available.  As long as threats to peace exist, for example, there 
must be military secrets.  A citizen must be able in confidence 
to complain to his government and to provide information 
just as he is—and should be—free to confide in the press 
without fear of reprisal or of being required to reveal or 
discuss his sources. . . 
 
I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the 
United States is an open society in which the people’s right 
to know is cherished and guarded.13 
 
 12  Statement by the President 1963-1969, supra note 10. 
 13  See White House Press Release, Statement by the President upon Signing S. 1106 (July 
4, 1966), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/Document%2037.pdf) (available 
at Records of White House Offices, 1963-1969, White House Press Office Files, Box 49, 
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The corresponding typed excerpts of the bill signing statement with 
President Johnson’s signature reflect substantial differences with the first 
and second drafts as well as the press release statement.  The 
corresponding excerpts from President Johnson’s hand-signed statement 
are as follows: 
This legislation springs from one of our most essential 
principles:  a democracy works best when the people have all 
the information that the security of the nation will permit. 
At the same time, the welfare of the nation or the rights of 
individuals may require that some documents not be made 
available.  As long as threats to peace exist, for example, there 
must be military secrets, a citizen must be able in confidence 
to complain to his government and to provide information 
just as he is—and should be—free to confide in the press 
without fear of reprisal or being required to discuss or reveal 
his sources. . . 
 
I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the 
United States is an open society.14 
In examining the statement with President Johnson’s signature, it is 
interesting to note that it did not contain the following statement: “No one 
should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be 
revealed without injury to the public interest.”15  It is also interesting to 
note, when examining various legislative records marking significant 
milestones of the FOIA, the legislative records do not cite the bill signing 
statement with President Johnson’s signature; rather the legislative 
records cite the White House Press Release statement containing the 
sentence deleted from President Johnson’s signed statement.16 
The first and second draft statements contain handwritten edits, and, 
upon viewing, one could reasonably conclude that the edits were made 
by two different individuals.  In addition to the draft statements and 
President Johnson’s signed statement, the National Security Archive also 
located a handwritten note from President Johnson’s library (with the 
initials G.C.).  It reads: “We have talked to Bill Moyers and given him 
this statement along with your thought about newspapers protecting their 
 
6/30/66-7/15/66, PR 210a – PR 2134a, LBJ Library) [hereinafter “White House Press 
Release”]; see also Blanton, supra note 4. 
 14  See White House Press Prelease, supra note 13; see also Blanton, supra note 4. 
 15  See White House Press Prelease, supra note 13; see also Blanton, supra note 4. 
 16  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE 
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) and JOINT 
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (PUB. L. NO. 93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
TEXTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).  However, President Johnson 
did not include this particular sentence in the statement he ultimately signed; see also supra 
note 10. 
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sources of information.  He will work on it and be back in touch later.”17  
According to Mr. Blanton, it is unclear from the documents whether 
President Johnson personally edited the statements or directed his Press 
Secretary, Mr. Moyers, to make the changes.18  This article is not 
attempting to answer this question or resolve the apparent conflicts 
between the various documents (e.g., press release statement versus 
hand-signed statement).  Rather, the revisions to the bill signing 
statements (drafts, press release statement, and final, hand-signed 
statement) show the tension that existed, from the onset, between the 
public’s right to access and the USG’s need to protect national security 
interests, and determining what that balance should be.  This foreshadows 
the litigious debate between the two competing interests that continues to 
exist to this day. 
III. THE HISTORY BEHIND ACCESS OR RATHER LACK OF ACCESS TO 
GOVERNMENT RECORDS 
According to the National Freedom of Information Coalition, 
Dr. Harold L. Cross is generally given credit as the author of the FOIA, 
as it was DR. CROSS’ 1953 book, The People’s Right to Know: Legal 
Access to Public Records and Proceedings, which “laid the 
groundwork for the legislation.”19  In his 1953 book, Dr. Cross identified 
three legal authorities the USG historically relied upon as a legal basis to 
withhold records from the public and/or Congress and opined that, 
“through legislative inaction, the weed of improper secrecy had been 
permitted to blossom and was choking out the basic right to know . . . .”20  
Those three legal authorities were the Records Act of 1789,21 the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) of 1946,22 and the Executive 
Privilege.23 
A.  The Records Act of 1789 
The Records Act of 1789 is also known as the housekeeping statute 
 
 17  Statement by the President 1963-1969, supra note 10. 
 18  Bridis, supra note 4. 
 19  National FOIA Hall of Fame, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COAL., http: 
www.nfoic.org/print/national-foia-hall-fame (last visited Sept. 9, 2016); Hall of Fame, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/hall-of-fame/harold-l-cross (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2016).   
 20  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, pt. 1, at 23 (1966).   
 21  Id. (citing the Records Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 68 (1789)) (codified in Rev. Stat. Title IV 
§ 161 (1875)), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1966).   
 22  Id. (citing APA, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946)), amended by APA, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(1966).   
 23  Id.  
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as it gave the executive agencies authority to set up offices and maintain 
government records.24  While various FOIA cases indicate that the USG 
relied upon the Records Act of 1789 as authority to withhold records, 
there is nothing within the Act itself that mentions access and/or lack of 
access to government records by the public.25 
In 1875, the Records Act of 1789 was subsequently amended and 
codified as follows: “The head of each Department is authorized to 
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his 
Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and 
performance of its business and the custody, use, and preservation of the 
records, papers, and property appertaining to it.”26  Again, the amended 
statute, on its face, does not purport to authorize the USG to withhold 
records requested from an individual or entity.  However, according to a 
1958 Congressional Report, the first apparent use of the Records Act of 
1789 as authority to withhold records was in 1877 when the United States 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provided this recommendation to 
President Rutherford B. Hayes.27  From 1877 to March 1958, the Records 
Act of 1789 was routinely used by various federal agencies as authority 
to withhold records requested from individuals and/or entities.28  On 
August 12, 1958, Congress again amended the Records Act of 1789 to 
add the following statement: “This section does not authorize 
withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of 
records to the public.”29  While the added sentence placed federal 
agencies on notice that the Records Act of 1789, as amended, should no 
longer be used as legal authority to withhold records, a few federal 
agencies still relied upon this statute as the legal basis to withhold records 
from the public up until 1972.30 
B. The Administrative Procedures Act 
As compared to the Records Act of 1789, the APA has a relatively 
short history as it was enacted in 1946.31  Section 3 of the APA of 1946, 
entitled Public Information, requires federal agencies to publish or make 
available organizational data, general statements of policy, rules, and 
 
 24  Chrysler Corp. v. Sec’y of Def., 441 U.S. 281, 309-310 (1979). 
 25  1 Stat. 68 (1789). 
 26  Rev. Stat. Title IV § 161, (1875), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), amended by 5 
U.S.C. § 301 (1966). 
 27  H.R. REP. NO. 85-1621, 1958 WL 3907 (1958) (Leg. Hist.). 
 28  See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1621. 
 29  Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958).   
 30  See Joint Comm. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-502.   
 31  CONG. REC. 2135, 2165 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1946). 
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final orders, unless the records pertained to or involved “(1) any function 
of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any 
matter relating solely to the internal management of any agency . . . .”32  
The APA of 1946 also permits the USG to withhold requested records if 
there was a confidential need, based upon good cause, or the person 
requesting the records was not “properly and directly concerned”33 to the 
records requested.34  Again, Congressional history reveals that, in spite 
of the APA of 1946 Section 3’s title, Public Information, federal agencies 
routinely used the law as authority to withhold information rather than 
releasing information to the public when requested,35 and that 
“[i]mproper denials occur[ed] again and again.  For more than ten years, 
through the administration of both political parties, case after case of 
improper withholding based upon 5 U.S.C. [§] 1002 has been 
documented.”36  In drafting the 1966 FOIA, Congress wanted to firmly 
establish a philosophy of full agency disclosure to any person37 unless 
information was specifically exempt from release under clearly 
delineated statutory language, to provide an avenue of redress of judicial 
review (which was not available in 5 U.S.C. § 1002) to those that may 
have been wrongfully denied access to government records.38 
At the time Congress drafted the FOIA, Congress believed that it 
had established workable solutions between the public’s right of access 
to government records and the USG’s need for withholding records. 
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not 
an impossible one either.  It is not necessary to conclude that to protect 
one of the interests, the other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or 
substantially subordinated.  Success lies in providing a workable formula 
which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places 
 
 32  Id. 
 33  COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 89TH CONG. 48, FEDERAL PUBLIC RECORDS LAW: FIRST 
SESSION ON H.R. 5012-21, 5237, 5406, 5520, 5583, 6172, 6739, 7010, 7161 BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, 89th Cong. 48 (1965). 
 34  SEN. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38 (1965). 
 35  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, pt. 3 at 26. 
 36  Id.  
 37  The FOIA, as initially enacted, did not define any person.  However, in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 2002, Congress restricted access under the FOIA and noted that for any 
records of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act 
of 1947), if the requester is a government or representative of a government that is not a State, 
territory, commonwealth, or district of the United States.  National Security Act of 1947, 50 
U.S.C. § 401a(4).  See Pub. L. No. 107-306 § 312, 116 Stat. 2383 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(3)(E) (2003)). 
 38  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE 
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), at 6-8. 
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emphasis on the fullest possible disclosure.39 
Nonetheless, it is clear to anyone who works with the FOIA and 
government releases of information (whether the record is labeled 
classified, for official use only, unclassified, controlled unclassified 
information or has no marking at all) that, under the current rules and 
regulations, legal determinations for releases under the FOIA appear to 
be as varied as the number of federal attorneys who work in this area of 
law.  While some may consider this an exaggeration, all one has to do is 
briefly review the 2009 Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom 
of Information Act40 to understand how complex the FOIA and 
government releases of information can be and currently is.  When one 
combines the FOIA with Executive Orders (e.g., Executive Order 13526, 
Classified National Security Information41), Department of Defense 
(“DoD”) classification regulations, and then each individual Services’ 
and/or Combatant Commands’ classification regulations (if the entity has 
implemented any), the complexity of the issues are multiplied many times 
over. 
Since the FOIA’s enactment, it has been amended at least seven 
times,42 sometimes as a result of court decisions and sometimes as a result 
of a political scandal (e.g., Watergate).43  Some of the tension and/or 
frustration between access to government records and non-disclosure of 
government records exists because of the changes in technology, the 
current world situation, the United States prolonged “War on Terror,”44 
the current fight against al-Qaeda and/or those that seek to attack the 
 
 39  SEN. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38. 
 40  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOJ GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, 
(2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-freedom-information-act (last visited Sept. 9, 
2016).   
 41  See Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 705 (Jan. 5, 2010).   
 42  FOIA Legislative Materials, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip 
/foia-legislative-materials (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 43  The 1974 Amendment was passed over President Gerald Ford’s veto.  The 1976 
Amendment was part of the Government Sunshine Act.  The 1996 Amendment is known as 
the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendment.  The 2002 Amendment placed limits 
on foreign agents’ ability to request records under the FOIA.  Other amendments were made 
in 1986, 2007, and 2009.  See FOIA Legislative History, THE NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2016); FOIA 
Legislative Materials, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-legislative-
materials (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 44   On August 6, 2009, Director John Brennan, then head of the White House’s 
Homeland Security Office, stated at a speech to the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, that “war on terrorism,” “global war,” and “fighting jihadists’” would no longer be 
“acceptable words inside the White House . . . The only terminology . . . the administration is 
using is that the U.S. is ‘at war with al Qaeda.’”  See White House: ‘War on Terrorism’ Is 
Over, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/6/ 
white-house-war-terrorism-over/. 
ECKART - MACRO - 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/2017  3:28 PM 
2017] THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 251 
United States (whether from within the United States or outside of the 
United States).  However, some of the tension exists because of a lack of 
understanding of the DoD’s rules and regulations about how the DoD 
labels (or marks) documents, what those labels mean, and what is 
required under the information security and/or classification rules and 
regulations. 
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOIA 
When a federal agency receives a proper FOIA request, which 
includes a reasonable description of the requested records and is 
submitted in accordance with the agency’s published regulations, the 
federal agency “shall make the records promptly available to any 
person.”45  The agency generally has twenty business days to comply with 
the request, although the agency may extend the time limit by no more 
than ten working days for unusual circumstances.46  If the agency fails to 
meet the processing-time requirements, or if the FOIA request is denied47 
or redacted pursuant to the withholding exemptions articulated in the 
FOIA,48 the requester may file a complaint in federal district court, to 
include the district where the requester lives, the requester’s principle 
place of business, where the federal agency records reside, or in the 
District of Columbia.49  Moreover, “[T]he court shall determine the 
matter de novo,50 and may examine the contents of such agency records 
in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be 
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) . . . and 
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.”51 
V. JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE FOIA 
FOIA cases are routinely decided on motions for summary 
judgment,52 which are appropriate “when the pleadings, the discovery 
 
 45  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2015). 
 46  Id. §§ 552(a)(6)(A), (B). 
 47  See id. § 552(a)(4) (for other reasons stated within the statute, e.g., denial of request 
to waive fees, a finding of no records, etc.). 
 48  Id. § 552(b)(2) to (b)(9). 
 49  Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 50  “De novo is from Latin, meaning ‘from the new.’”  When a court hears a case de novo, 
it is deciding the issues without reference to the legal conclusions or assumptions made by 
the previous court to hear the case.  An appeals court hearing a case de novo may refer to the 
trial court’s record to determine the facts, but will rule on the evidence and matters of law 
without giving deference to that court’s findings.”  WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, CORNELL UNIV. 
LAW SCH., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/de_novo (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 51  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2015).  
 52  Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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materials on file, and any affidavits or declarations ‘show [ ] that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.’”53  In most FOIA cases, once the documents 
are properly identified, the FOIA requester and the federal agency 
(simply) have different interpretations as to the application of the 
exemptions, based upon the law, to the redacted information/record.54  
Thus, the court determines whether the agency sustained its burden that 
the requested records are exempt from release under the FOIA.55 
Since the FOIA’s enactment, courts have consistently recognized 
Congress’ intent to favor release over the withholding (or non-release) of 
government records by specifically acknowledging in numerous opinions 
that the FOIA mandate is one of release, and a federal agency may only 
deny a request (or portion thereof) when the records fall within one or 
more of the enumerated nine withholding exemptions, which are to be 
narrowly construed.  If the federal agency decides to withhold the records 
(or a portion thereof), the federal agency bears the burden of proof for 
withholding the records, and such determination is reviewed by the court 
de novo.56 
To determine whether the federal agency met its burden that the 
requested records are exempt from release, courts consider the underlying 
purpose of the FOIA, and some of those cited purposes include the 
following: 
a. “[T]o pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to 
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.”57 
 
b. “[T]o ‘contribut[e] significantly to public understanding 
of the operations or activities of the government.’”58  
FOIA’s fundamental policy “focuses on the citizens’ 
right to be informed about ‘what their government is up 
to.’  Official information that sheds light on an agency’s 
performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within 
that statutory purpose.”59 
 
c. “[T]o ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the 
 
 53  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing FED. 
R. CIV. PROC. 56(a)).   
 54  See Jones-Edwards v. Appeal Bd. of the Nat’l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec. Agency, 352 F. 
Supp. 2d 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 55  Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 56  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989); U.S. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 
(D.C. Cir. 2007).  
 57  U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 352, 361 (1976).   
 58  N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 749, 775) (1989)). 
 59  Id. at 632. 
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functioning of a democratic society, needed to check 
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable 
to the governed.”60 
 
d. “[T]o permit access to official information long shielded 
unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a 
judicially enforceable public right to secure such 
information from possibly unwilling official hands.”61 
 
e. “‘[T]o promote honest and open government and to 
assure the existence of an informed citizenry to hold the 
governors accountable to the governed.’”62 
After recognizing the underlying release nature of the FOIA, courts 
have consistently addressed the narrow construction of the FOIA 
exemptions, the burden of full or partial redaction (to include the 
obligation to reasonably segregate the releasable portion from the non-
releasable portion) is upon the federal agency, and the agency generally 
fulfills its obligations via affidavits (or declarations), usually with a 
Vaughn Index.63  In addition, so long as the “agency’s affidavit describes 
the justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, 
demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the 
claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the 
record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then affidavit alone 
warrants summary judgment.”64 Exemption (b)(1), Classified 
Information, is not excluded from the narrow construction of the 
withholding exemptions under the FOIA. 
VI. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
AND FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INFORMATION? 
Before examining the withholding of records as classified 
information pursuant to exemption (b)(1), one must first understand the 
difference between classified information and for official use only 
information. And, in order to understand this difference, one must 
understand the USG’s terms and labels or markings.  Unfortunately, there 
appears to be a lack of understanding regarding restrictive labels or 
markings on DoD records, especially if the label is for official use only 
 
 60  NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citing STAFF OF S. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE 
MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, at 38). 
 61  Mink v. EPA, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973), superseded by statute 5 U.S.C. 
§552(a)(4)(B)(1974). 
 62  Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Grand 
Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 63  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 500-506; (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 64  ACLU. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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(“FOUO”) or unclassified//for official use only (“ U//FOUO”).  In an 
August 2, 2013, Christian Science Monitor article entitled, Too Many 
Classified Papers At Pentagon?  Time For A Secrecy Audit,65 an 
anonymous congressional staffer questioned the United States 
Department of Army’s (“DA”) need to mark a Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) audit report U//FOUO.  According to the 
journalist, again citing the anonymous congressional staffer, the GAO 
report was unfavorable of the “military’s Distributed Common Ground 
System, a computer program that US troops use to process intelligence in 
war zones.”66  While the congressional staffer was not authorized to speak 
about the GAO report, the staffer stated: 
The Army chose to classify that document in such a way that 
prevented the GAO from displaying it on its web site.  It’s 
very easy to put a classification on a document to keep it out 
of public view. . . . There was nothing in that report that 
included national security secrets, but the Army used the 
classification process in that moment to keep that report off 
the web site and available for anyone to access.67 
Both the title of the Christian Science Monitor’s article and the 
congressional staffer’s reference to U//FOUO as a classification label 
reflects the lack of understanding of the term FOUO or U//FOUO, not 
only from a classification perspective, but also from the FOIA 
perspective. 
A.  What Is for Official Use Only Information and How Does It 
Relate to the Classification Regulations and Releases Under 
the FOIA? 
First and foremost, FOUO is not a classification level and thus, it is 
not a classification label or classification marking.  There are only three 
classification levels, and they are defined in Executive Order 13526, 
Classified National Security Information (“E.O. 13526”).  Per E.O. 
13526, section 1.2(a), information may only be classified at three levels 
and those classification levels shall be applied to information based upon 
an original classification authority’s (“OCA’s”) determination that the 
unauthorized release of the information could be expected to cause some 
level of national security harm.68  The three classification levels are: (1) 
Top Secret, which applies to information which if released without 
authority could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave 
 
 65  Anna Mulrine, Too Many Classified Papers at Pentagon? Time for a Secrecy Audit, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0802/ 
Too-many-classified-papers-at-Pentagon-Time-for-a-secrecy-audit. 
 66  Id.  
 67  Id.   
 68  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, §§ 1.1, 1.2; 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
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damage to the national security; (2) Secret, which applies to information 
which if released without authority could  reasonably be expected to 
cause serious damage to the national security; and (3) Confidential, which 
applies to information which if released without authority could 
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.69 
Even if E.O. 13526, section 1.2(a) fails to clearly state that there are 
only three classification levels, E.O. 13526, section 1.2(b) asserts that, 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used 
to identify United States classified information.”70  The DoD further 
emphasized this point in implementing its regulations, again only 
recognizing three classification levels and labels,71 but also for FOUO 
information in that “by definition, information must be unclassified in 
order to be designated FOUO.”72 
Given that there are only three enumerated classification levels, it 
should be clear, or at least intuitive, that information labeled or marked 
either FOUO or U//FOUO is unclassified information.  Thus, the million-
dollar questions become what is FOUO information and how does it 
pertain to releases under the FOIA?  Again, going to the regulation, 
FOUO is a dissemination control (label or mark) applied by the DoD to 
unclassified information when disclosure to the public of that particular 
record, or portion thereof, would reasonably be expected to cause 
foreseeable harm to an interest protected by one or more of FOIA 
exemptions (b)2 through (b)9.73  The DoD is not authorized to withhold 
FOUO information under FOIA exemption (b)(1), Classified 
Information, as FOUO information is not classified information.74 
One may argue that the journalist and congressional staffer used the 
term classifying under a more generic definition of arranging the item 
(e.g., report) according to subject matter or assigning the report to a 
category,75 in this case the category of information that falls within FOIA 
 
 69  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.2; 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010).   
 70  Id.   
 71  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. MANUAL 5200.01, Vol. 1, DOD INFO. SEC. PROGRAM: 
OVERVIEW, CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION, enclosure 4, paras. 3, 34 (Feb. 24, 
2012) [hereinafter “OVERVIEW, CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION”]. 
 72  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. MANUAL 5200.01, Vol. 4, DOD INFO. SEC. PROGRAM: 
CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO, supra note 71, at enclosure 3, paras. 2b(2), 12.  (Feb. 24, 
2012) [hereinafter “CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO”]. 
 73  Id. at para 2a, 11. 
 74  One caveat as a federal agency does have the ability to classify a record after receipt 
of a FOIA request, if it meets all other requirements under the Executive Order 13526 for 
classification purposes.  See Exec. Ord. No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7d, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 
2009). 
 75  Classifying, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (150th ed. 1981). 
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exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9).76  However, it is also important to 
understand that simply marking the information FOUO does not 
automatically qualify it for non-release under the FOIA.77  If a FOIA 
request is received for a record that has been labeled FOUO or U//FOUO, 
it would be processed under the FOIA to determine if it truly qualifies for 
redaction under exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9).78 
The journalist and anonymous congressional staffer also imply that, 
if the DA had not marked the report FOUO, the record is automatically 
fully releasable and immediately available to the public.  However, this 
conclusion is also inaccurate.  The fact that a DoD entity has not placed 
any label and/or dissemination control marking on a record does not in 
and of itself automatically mean the record is fully releasable and 
available to the public.  As stated in DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4, 
“the absence of the FOUO marking does not automatically mean the 
information shall be released.”79  In the case of the GAO report, even if 
the DA had not marked or labeled the report FOUO or U//FOUO, this 
would not mean that the GAO could place the report on its webpage.  As 
required by DoD guidance, “[a]ll DoD unclassified information MUST 
BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED FOR RELEASE through standard 
DoD Component processes before it is provided to the public (including 
via posting to publicly accessible websites) in accordance with DoDD 
[Department of Defense Directive] 5230.09 . . . and other applicable 
regulations.”80 
In sum, by definition FOUO is unclassified information.  The fact a 
document is labeled or has a dissemination control marking of FOUO 
does not mean that the record is not released to the public under the FOIA.  
Alternatively, the fact that a record does not have any label or control 
marking on the record does not mean that the record is automatically fully 
available to the public.  The function of the FOUO label/mark is to place 
on notice or to inform a DoD employee that the record may contain 
 
 76  Because the congressional staffer clearly states that there were no harm to national 
security interests (which pertain only to classified information and the level of national 
security harm), it is doubtful that the journalist and congressional staffers used the term 
“classify” in the generic sense to categorize the report based upon information that is protected 
by (b)(2) through (b)(9).  In addition, the article quotes Steven Aftergood, Director of the 
Federation of the American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy, as saying:, 
“Currently, there is ‘robust disagreement’ both within the intelligence community and within 
federal agencies about what should be classified.”  However, for purposes of this article, this 
argument of a generic term of classification and categorizing the records as exempt from 
release under the FOIA pursuant to (b)(2) through (b)((9) will be considered.   
 77  CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO, supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 2c(2), 13.  
 78  CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO, supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 2c(2), 13.  
 79  CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO, supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 2c(2), 13.  
 80  CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO, supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 1f, 10.  
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special categories of information which require some level of special 
processing, handling and/or storing.  The FOUO information contained 
in the document could be attorney-work product or attorney-client 
communications; unclassified but sensitive security protocols; or 
personally identifying information such as a social security number, date 
of birth, medical information; or other categories of information which 
fall within FOIA exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9), and thus require some 
level of special processing, handling and/or storing of the information. 
B.  Will Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified 
Information, Solve the Confusion Between a Restrictive, 
Unclassified Dissemination Control Label and Releases Under 
the FOIA? 
Shortly after assuming office, President Barack Obama issued 
various memorandums concerning transparency of the federal 
government.  In a January 21, 2009 memorandum, President Obama 
stated, “My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented 
level of openness in Government.  We will work together to ensure the 
public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, 
and collaboration.  Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote 
efficiency and effectiveness in Government.”81  Part of the transparency 
process was the direction that a task force take to review executive 
agencies’ processes on controlled, unclassified information82 to include 
the procedures for marking, safeguarding, and disseminating sensitive 
but unclassified (“SBU”)83 information.  The Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the United States Attorney General co-chaired the task 
force84 and on August 25, 2009, issued a report entitled Report and 
 
 81  Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Administration of Barack H. Obama, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 10 (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.archives.gov/files/cui/documents/2009-WH-memo-on-
transparency-and-open-government.pdf). 
 82  Memorandum on Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information for 
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 8 (May 27, 2009),  https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-classified-information-and-
controlled-unclassified-informat). 
 83  Sensitive But Unclassified (“SBU”) information is a generic term used to refer to 117 
different types of designations used with the Executive Branch for documents/information 
that require some level of protection but do not meet the standards for national security 
classification.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. AND U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REP. AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED 
INFO (2009), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cui_task_force_rpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016) [hereinafter “REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS”]. 
 84  Memorandum on Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information, 
supra note 82.   
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Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Controlled 
Unclassified Information.85  Overall, the task force made forty 
recommendations adjusting or modifying current procedures for 
marking, safeguarding and disseminating SBU information.  One of those 
recommendations was the establishment of one single, standardized 
program for identifying, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating 
information across the federal government as the task force had identified 
approximately 117 different SBU terms used by various federal 
agencies.86  Based upon the task force’s recommendations, President 
Obama directed his National Security Staff to draft an Executive Order 
supporting key elements of the task force’s recommendations that would 
apply to the full spectrum of SBU information (and not be limited to 
terrorism records/information).87 
On November 4, 2010, E.O. 13556, Controlled Unclassified 
Information, was issued88 and designated the National Archives and 
Records Administration (“NARA”) as the Executive Agent (“EA”) for its 
implementation.89  Pursuant to E.O. 13556, the controlled unclassified 
information (“CUI”) label “shall serve as exclusive designations for 
identifying unclassified information throughout the executive branch that 
requires safeguarding or dissemination controls, pursuant to and 
consistent with applicable law, regulations and Government-wide 
policies.”90 
Pursuant to E.O. 13556, section 4(d), NARA was to establish and 
maintain a publicly available CUI registry that identifies each category 
and/or sub-category of records requiring limited distribution.91  As part 
of its implementation process, in June of 2011, NARA issued guidance 
to federal agencies requiring them to designate CUI records/information 
that required safeguarding or dissemination controls based upon existing 
 
 85  REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 83. 
 86  REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 83. 
 87  See REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 83; see also CUI Chronology and 
History, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/cui/chronology. 
html (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).   
 88  Exec. Order No. 13556; 75 Fed. Reg. 68, 675 (Nov. 9, 2010). 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. 
 91  While Executive Order No. 13556 required that the CUI registry to be established 
within one year of the date of the Order, which would have been no later than November 9, 
2010, as of January 26, 2015, the CUI registry list was not complete.  And, while the CUI 
Registry webpage appears to be final, NARA has the following statement on its registry’s 
webpage: “Existing agency policy for all sensitive unclassified information remains in effect 
until your agency implements the CUI program.  Direct any questions to your agency’s CUI 
program office.”  See NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN. CUI REGISTRY, 
https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).   
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law, regulation, or a Government-wide policy.  In addition, federal 
agencies were to provide to NARA the underlying authority requiring the 
safeguarding or dissemination control of the record.92  Since NARA’s 
initial guidance was issued, many categories or subcategories of records 
or information have been identified as CUI, and, per NARA, the CUI 
Registry “identifies all approved CUI categories and subcategories, 
provides general descriptions for each, identifies the basis for controls, 
establishes markings, and includes guidance on handling procedures.”93 
E.O. 13556 attempted to clear up the potential confusion between 
the label of CUI on a record and the FOIA by directly addressing the 
relationship (or lack thereof) between the term CUI and release or non-
release under the FOIA.  E.O. 13556 specifically states: “The mere fact 
that information is designated as CUI shall not have a bearing on 
determinations pursuant to any law requiring the disclosure of 
information or permitting disclosure as a matter of discretion, including 
disclosures to the legislative or judicial branches.”94  However, in spite 
of E.O. 13556’s attempt to clear up the confusion between records or 
information identified as CUI and the FOIA, shortly after its 
implementation, various federal agencies began to raise questions 
concerning the relationship between the FOIA and the Executive Order, 
thus requiring NARA and the DoJ to issue supplemental guidance on 
November 22, 2011.95  In an updated 2014 joint, co-signed memorandum 
entitled Guidance regarding Controlled Unclassified Information and the 
Freedom of Information Act, the DoJ and NARA provided the following 
guidance: 
The FOIA should not be cited as a safeguarding or 
dissemination control authority for CUI.  The purpose of the 
FOIA is to open agency activities to the public. 
 
The FOIA gives the public the right to request and receive 
federal agency records unless those records are protected 
from disclosure by one of the Act’s exemptions. 
 
 
 92  NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) 
INFO. Office Notice 2011-01: Initial Implementation Guidance for Executive Order 13556, 
(June 9, 2011), httpshttp://www.archives.gov/files/cui/registry/policy-guidance/registry-
documents/2011-cuio-notice-2011-01-initial-guidance.pdf.   
 93  See CUI Registry, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov 
/cui/registry/cui-glossary.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016). 
 94  Exec. Order No. 13556 § 2b, 75 Fed. Reg. 68675 (Nov. 4, 2010). 
 95  Id., rescinded by Memorandum from John P. Fitzpatrick, Director, Information 
Security Oversight Office, to Melanie Ann Pustay, Director, Office of Information Policy, 
NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., Revised Guidance regarding Controlled 
Unclassified Information and the Freedom of Information Act (July 3, 2014),  
http://www.archives.gov/files/cui/registry/policy-guidance/registry-documents/2014-doj-
oip-cui-joint-issuance-on-foia.pdf. 
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The FOIA exemptions are discretionary.  As a result, FOIA 
exemptions should not be relied upon as an authority to create 
a CUI category or subcategory. 
 
CUI markings are not dispositive of a FOIA reviewer’s 
disclosure determination. 
 
Decisions to disclose or withhold information must be made 
based on the applicability of the statutory exemptions 
contained in the FOIA, not on a CUI marking or designation. 
 
When reviewing records, no markings of any kind, whether 
CUI or others that may appear in the same document shall be 
applied to require that unclassified information must be 
considered exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. 
 
No marking or statement may be paired with a CUI marking 
to circumvent the provision of the Executive Order that 
designation as CUI does not control disclosure under the 
FOIA. 
 
In sum, CUI markings and designations should not be 
associated with or paired to the FOIA exemptions and should 
not be used as a basis for applying a FOIA exemption.96 
Even though E.O. 13556 and the supplemental NARA–DoJ 
memorandum have attempted to clear up any relationship between the 
FOIA and the CUI label, the confusion between the FOIA and CUI label 
will continue to exist, and is actually unavoidable, for a number of 
reasons.  The first reason is the fact that federal agencies had to provide 
NARA with the statute, regulation, or government-wide practice that 
justified the label or mark of CUI.  Many of the statutes cited as authority 
for the dissemination control mark of CUI are statutes routinely cited by 
federal agencies for redacting information under the FOIA.  Examples of 
the statutes include the following: 
a. Privacy of Military Personnel,97 pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 
130b, Personnel Assigned to Overseas, Sensitive or 
Routinely Deployed Units, a statute that may be used by 
the DoD to redact specific, personal identifying 
information under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 
 
b. International Agreements,98 pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 130c, 
 
 96  Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., Revised Guidance regarding Controlled 
Unclassified Info and the Freedom of Information Act, (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/policy-guidance/registry-documents/2014-doj-oip-cui-
joint-issuance-on-foia.pdf. 
 97  See CUI Registry: Privacy-Military, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., 
http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/privacy-military.html (last visited Sept. 
15, 2016). 
 98  See CUI Registry: International Agreements, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS 
ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/categorydetail/internationalagreements.  
ECKART - MACRO - 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/2017  3:28 PM 
2017] THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 261 
Unclassified, Sensitive Foreign Government, a statute 
that may be used by DoD to redact unclassified, sensitive 
foreign government information under 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(3). 
 
c. Procurement and Acquisition-Source Selection,99 
pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 2102, prohibitions on disclosing 
and obtaining procurement information. 
 
d. Geodetic Product Information,100 pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 
455, a statute that may be used by the DoD to redact 
defined imagery and maps under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 
 
e. Legal Privilege:101 Examples of records commonly 
redacted under the FOIA include the following identified 
category or sub-category of records:  Attorney Work 
Product and/or Attorney Client Communications which 
are redacted under FOIA exemption (b)(5). 
By referencing a statute (regulation or government practice), FOIA 
is automatically brought into consideration because the authority for 
dissemination control directly correlates to a FOIA exemption such as 
(b)(3), Statutory Basis for Withholding Records, (b)(5), Inter-Agency or 
Intra-Agency Memorandum, (b)(6), Personal Privacy Interests/
Information, and/or (b)(7), Records Created for a Law Enforcement 
Purpose. 
Another reason confusion is unavoidable and will continue to exist 
between the CUI label and FOI releases is the limiting language of the 
label itself.  It does not matter whether the limiting label is CUI or FOUO.  
The current DoD regulations clearly state that the dissemination control 
label of U//FOUO or FOUO does not automatically mean the record is 
withheld under the FOIA.  It also clearly states that the lack of any 
dissemination control label does not mean that the record is automatically 
released under the FOIA and available to the public.  Understanding the 
dissemination control labels or terms requires understanding the 
implementing regulations and guidance pertaining to the label itself and 
understanding the process under FOIA, no matter what the label is or 
whether the document contains a label. 
 
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).   
 99  See CUI Registry: Procurement and Acquisition-Source Selection, NAT’L ARCHIVES 
AND RECORDS ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/ 
proprietary-source-selection.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).   
 100  See CUI Registry: Geodetic Product Information, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS 
ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/geodetic-product-info. 
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016). 
 101  See CUI Registry: Legal Privilege, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN.,  
https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/legal-privilege.html (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2016). 
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The same Christian Science Monitor article could have been written 
with the term CUI on the GAO report rather than FOUO.  Just as a federal 
agency has the ability to classify a record pursuant to E.O. 13526 at the 
time of a FOIA request,102 the government may need to identify a record 
as CUI at the time of a FOIA request since the document may not have 
been properly labeled (or not labeled) when it was initially drafted, 
regardless of meeting the CUI requirements as identified and listed on the 
NARA website.  The fact that the agency failed to properly mark a record 
at the time it was drafted and signed as final should not automatically 
determine its release or non-release under the FOIA.  For example, if a 
federal agency failed to mark medical records as CUI, this failure should 
not automatically require the federal agency to release the medical 
records at the time the FOIA request is received.  In the alternative, just 
because a CUI label has been applied to a document, that CUI label 
should not automatically mean that the document is not released as it may 
have been mislabeled.  The review of the CUI record would determine 
whether the record is released (or not) under the FOIA, just as the review 
of the record labeled FOUO (or not) is released (or not) under the FOIA.  
Finally, the confusion between the FOIA and the CUI label will continue 
to exist because the NARA website will become an additional resource 
to determine the underlying basis for withholding records under FOIA 
exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9), again bringing FOIA into the mix and 
continuing the confusion between releases under the FOIA and a limiting 
label. 
In the end, confusion between SBU or FOUO information and FOIA 
will more than likely continue as it is vital to understand the limiting 
terminology, be it CUI, FOUO or SBU.  While E.O. 13556 and NARA’s 
website has all the necessary information to understand the limiting label 
of CUI and the basis for the limited distribution, one must be proactive.  
FOIA requesters (reporters and congressional staffers) must still read the 
guidance, regulation, Executive Order, and information on NARA’s 
website in order to educate themselves on why such records are 
controlled and have a limited distribution.  This Article is skeptical that 
this will be achieved based upon the actions of prolific FOIA requesters 
and/or those who are skeptical or cynical of the USG’s actions.  These 
same parties will continue to request the CUI records and/or still question 
the USG’s marking/labeling of a record as CUI and argue that the USG’s 
true purpose was avoiding release of the record under the FOIA. 
Finally, one may conclude that this Article’s argument is against the 
CUI terminology or the registry.  That is not the case.  In fact, this Article 
 
 102  Mulrine, supra note 65. 
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does not recommend removing the limiting terminology of CUI on any 
executive agency’s records as there must be some identification marking 
that informs those who process and/or work with the record/information 
that it must be safeguard in some manner.  In addition, there will be, from 
a logical standpoint, a substantial benefit to the USG in using one 
government-wide term and program/process for safeguarding CUI.  The 
establishment of one uniform program for identifying, marking, 
safeguarding, and/or disseminating CUI should lead to an effective and 
efficient understanding of CUI as having 117 different labels or 
dissemination control markings for SBU information is excessive.  This 
Article is simply skeptical that the NARA registry will clear up the 
confusion between the CUI label and releases under the FOIA.  The basis 
includes those reasons noted above; however, there will always be those 
individuals who are suspicious of the USG and ultimately believe that the 
federal agencies/individual services are more concerned with their 
reputations or are attempting to hide something.  Ultimately, only time 
will tell whether the task force’s goals will be achieved, at least from the 
perspective of release under the FOIA and having a dissemination control 
label. 
VII. RECORDS CLASSIFIED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526, 
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, AND RELEASES 
UNDER THE FOIA 
Exemption (b)(1), of 5 U.S.C. § 552, authorizes a federal agency to 
exempt records or information from mandatory release if the information 
is “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy 
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive 
order.”103  E.O. 13526 sets out the procedural and substantive 
requirements for classifying (and declassifying) records; however, E.O. 
13526 also immediately recognizes the tension between release of 
information and protecting national security interests with the following 
statement: 
Our democratic principles require that the American people 
be informed of the activities of their Government.  Also, our 
Nation’s progress depends on the free flow of information 
both within the Government and to the American people.  
Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense has 
required that certain information be maintained in confidence 
in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, 
our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign 
 
 103  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2015).  
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nations.104 
Even though E.O. 13526 provides specifics on procedural and 
substantive requirements on classifying and declassifying records, there 
is still a level of subjectivity in making these determinations, which 
intensifies the tension between release of information and the need to 
protect national security interests.  However, understanding the 
procedural and substantive requirements articulated in E.O. 13526 
hopefully decrease that tension. 
A.  Which Executive Order Applies to the Classified Information? 
Ideally, the first question that should be asked when reviewing 
classified records for release under the FOIA is what Executive Order 
applies to information classified prior to December 29, 2009, the date of 
the current Executive Order, E.O. 13526.  As held in Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice,105 “the Executive Order in effect at the time the classifying 
official acted states the relevant criteria for purposes of determining 
whether Exemption 1 properly was invoked.. . . Thus information once 
properly classified under a prior Executive Order will retain the 
protection afforded it under the former Order.”106  This is not to say that 
a federal agency does not have the opportunity to reevaluate the 
continued need to classify the record under the current Executive Order 
or the need to reclassify the record at a higher classification level.107  
However, the federal agency may invoke exemption (b)(1) for the 
withholding of classified information “only if it complies with 
classification procedures established by the relevant executive order and 
withholds only such material as conforms to the order’s substantive 
criteria for classification.”108 
B. Procedural Requirements Pursuant to Executive Order 13526, 
Classified National Security Information 
Some of E.O. 13526’s procedural requirements include who is 
authorized to classify a record/information, what record may be 
 
 104  Exec. Order No. 13526, at 707.   
 105  Lesar, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 106  Id. at 480. 
 107  Id.  It should be noted that because a classification review would occur at the time the 
FOIA request is received/processed, in reality, the federal agency would review the need for 
continued classification under the E.O. in effect at the time the FOIA request was received.  
The Lesar Court was faced with somewhat unusual facts where the E.O. was updated after 
the district court issued its decision, and on appeal, the Appellant argued the classification 
review should occur under the updated E.O., thus presenting the court the issue of which E.O. 
applied to the records.  See Lesar, 636 F.2d at 479-480.   
 108  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 857 F. Supp. 2d. 44, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
aff’d, 715 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013).   
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classified, how the record is classified (original classification authority 
versus derivative classification authority), identification and marking 
requirements, etc.  The USG may only classify information that “is 
owned by, produced by, or is under the control of the United States 
Government.”109  Information may be classified either by an original 
classification authority [hereinafter OCA] or via a derivative 
classification determination.110  OCAs are the President, the Vice 
President, agency heads and officials designated by the President, and 
those specifically delegated OCA in accordance with the procedures 
outlined in E.O. 13526.111  President Obama delegated OCA to agency 
heads on December 29, 2009.112  E.O. 13526 also requires that those that 
are delegated OCA (in accordance with E.O 13526) are to be limited to 
the minimum number required to implement E.O. 13526.113  The DoD 
has further delegated OCAs by position, in accordance with the 
requirements outlined in E.O. 13526.114 
Derivative classification of information is based upon either an 
individual’s reproduction, extraction, or summarization of classified 
information, the classification of source material or a security 
classification guide.115  As previously mentioned, E.O. 13526 requires the 
individual who is derivatively classifying the information to provide 
specific details as to how the information was derivatively classified 
including the source documents.116 
As outlined in E.O. 13526, section 1.2(a), information may only be 
classified at three levels and those levels shall be applied to information 
based upon an OCA’s determination117 that the unauthorized release of 
the information could be expected to cause some level of harm to national 
security.  As noted, there are only three classification levels and they are 
top secret, both secret and confidential.118  In addition to the above-
referenced procedural requirements, a federal agency may classify a 
 
 109  Exec. Order No. 13526 § 1.1(a)(2). 
 110  Id. pt. 1, § 1(a)(2). 
 111  Id. pt. 1, § 1.3.  
 112  Order: Original Classification Authority, 75 Fed. Reg. 735 (Jan. 5, 2010). 
 113  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.3(c)(1). 
 114  U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF SEC’Y OF DEFENSE 04545-11, DELEGATION OF 
TOP SECRET ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY (2011) and U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
ASST. SEC’Y OF DEFENSE, DELEGATION OF SECRET ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 
(1995), Supplemented in 2009.   
 115  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 2, § 2.1.   
 116  Id. pt. 2, § 2. 
 117  Id. pt. 1, § 1.2(a) requires an Original Classification Authority to be able to identify 
and describe that national security harm.   
 118  Supra note 68. 
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record at the time a FOIA request is received;119 however, E.O. 13526 
requires a higher level of review of the information to be classified at the 
time of a FOIA request in that the federal agency must: (1) meet the 
E.O.’s overall requirements and (2) the agency head, the deputy agency 
head or the senior agency head (as defined by E.O. 13526, section 5.4) 
conducts a document-by-document review.120 
The DoD has its own implementing classification procedural 
requirements as outlined in DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 2, DoD 
Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information.121  In 
addition to the E.O. 13526 and DoD regulations,122 individual Services 
and other federal (defense) agencies may choose to supplement E.O. 
13526 and the DoD manuals/regulations with their specific component 
classification regulations.123 
When courts review the classification of records, they examine 
whether the federal agency has met both the procedural requirements and 
substantive requirements of E.O. 13526.  And while there may be defects 
in the procedural requirements of classified information at the time a 
FOIA request is received (and thus cured after a FOIA request is 
received), courts appear to be reluctant to order a federal agency to release 
a classified document that otherwise meets the substantive requirements 
for classification.124  As noted by the Lesar Court, this result would not 
be sensible and “would only be perverse.”125  However, the ability to cure 
procedural defects should not be interpreted to mean that courts have 
given federal agencies authority to ignore the procedural requirements 
mandated under both E.O. 13526 and any supplementing regulations.  
Again, as noted by the Lesar Court, 
[W]e do not mean to imply that only the substantive standards 
of the governing Executive Order must be followed:  the 
statute requires both procedural and substantive conformity 
 
 119  See Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, §1.7(d); see also DoDR-5400.7-R, DEP’T OF 
DEFENSE FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT PROGRAM (2006) available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs 
/directives/corres/pdf/540007r.pdf.; DoDR-5400.7-R, DEP’T OF DEF. FREEDOM OF INFO. 
ACT PROGRAM, 79 Fed. Reg. 52499 (proposed rule Sep. 3, 2014). 
 120  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7(d).   
 121  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. MANUAL 5200.01, Vol. 2, DOD INFO. SEC. PROGRAM: MARKING 
OF CLASSIFIED INFO. (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 122  DoDM 5200.01 Vol 1, DoDM 5200.01 Vol 2, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. MANUAL 5200.01, 
Vol. 3, DOD INFO. SEC. PROGRAM: PROT. OF CLASSIFIED INFO. (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 123  See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTRU. 31-401, INFO. SEC. PROGRAM 
MGMT. (Nov. 1, 2005), as amended; U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 380-5, DEP’T OF THE 
ARMY INFO. SEC.  PROGRAM (Sep. 29, 2000). 
 124 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 857 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
aff’d, 715 F.3d 937, D.C. Cir. (2013); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 478, 
484 (1980).   
 125  See Lesar, 636 F.2d at 484.  
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for proper classification.  Rather we recognize that the 
consequences of particular violations may vary; some 
substantive violations may require either a remand to the 
district court for in camera inspection of the materials or the 
release of the documents.  For procedural violations, some 
may be of such importance to reflect adversely on the 
agency’s overall classification decision, requiring a remand 
to the district court for in camera inspection; while others may 
be insignificant, undermining not at all the agency’s 
classification decision.126 
The Lesar Court also noted that the then existing E.O. [E.O. 12065] 
contained a provision that allowed classification of a document after the 
date of its origination (or at the time of the FOIA request),127 which is 
consistent with the current E.O.  It simply requires a higher level of 
review.  Finally, E.O. 13526 has attempted to correct procedural defect 
arguments with the following statement: “information assigned a level of 
classification under this or predecessor orders shall be considered as 
classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other 
required markings.”128  While a federal agency should not rely upon this 
particular sentence as carte blanche to avoid procedural classification 
requirements, it is at least available for use by a federal agency in 
defending a procedural classification defect.  And, even though one may 
cite E.O. 13526, section 1.6(f) when defending a procedural classification 
defect, the federal agency should correct the procedural error once the 
error is discovered. 
C. Substantive Requirements Pursuant to Executive Order 13526, 
Classified National Security Information 
E.O. 13526 also outlines the substantive requirements for 
classifying records and/or information, and those substantive 
requirements include the category of information that can be classified 
and the level of harm to national security.  First, the record or information 
that may be classified must fall within one (or more) of the eight (8) 
enumerated categories listed in the E.O.: (a) military plans, weapons 
systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c) 
intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources, or 
methods, or cryptology; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the 
 
 126  Id. at 485.  
 127  Id. at 484, Exec. Order No. 12065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (1978), as amended.  Exec. 
Order No. 12065 and Exec. Order No. 13526 authorize classification of a record/information 
after a FOIA request is received, although with a higher level review by the deciding official 
(e.g. agency head or deputy agency head for Exec. Order No. 12065 and agency head, deputy 
agency head, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4 for Exec. Order No. 
13526).   
 128  Exec. Order No. 13526 pt., 1, § 1.6(f).   
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United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, 
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; (f) 
United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials 
or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, 
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the 
national security; or (h) the development, production, or use of weapons 
of mass destruction.129 
The second substantive requirement is that federal agents must be 
able to articulate the harm to national security at one of the three 
classification levels of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret.  It is also 
important for one to be aware that national security is defined as “the 
national defense or foreign relations of the United States”130 and the 
“defense against transnational terrorism.”131 
While not identified as a substantive requirement, E.O. 13526 
specifically prohibits the classification of information, continued 
classification or failure to declassify information in order to (a) conceal 
inefficiency, administrative error or violations of law; (b) avoid or 
prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; (c) restrict 
competition; or (d) delay the information’s release when the information 
no longer requires the protection in the interest of the national security.132 
D.  Judicial Standard of Review and Analysis for Classified 
Records Requested Under the FOIA 
When a federal agency withholds records pursuant to exemption 
(b)(1), the FOIA requester’s avenue of redress of the agency’s decision 
is through the judicial system, with a court’s de novo review and the 
burden upon the federal agency to articulate the justification for 
withholding of the record.133  Again, exemption (b)(1) cases are routinely 
adjudicated via summary judgment as: 
[s]ummary judgment is warranted on the basis of agency 
affidavits when the affidavits describe the justifications for 
nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate 
that the information withheld logically falls within the 
claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either 
contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad 
faith.134 
Facially, exemption (b)(1) cases appear to be no different than 
 
 129  Id. pt. 1, § 1.4.  
 130  Id. pt. 6, § 6.1(cc).  
 131  Id. pt. 1, § 1.1(a)(4).   
 132  Id. pt. 1, § 1.7(a). 
 133  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
 134  Larsen v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (citing Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d. 
773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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litigation pertaining to the withholding of information and records under 
other FOIA exemptions (i.e. 5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(2) through (b)(9)).  
However, the complexity of cases pertaining to classified information, 
national security, and protection of the United States is pronounced and 
best summarized by Judge Colleen McMahon, of the Washington D.C. 
District Court, when faced with the FOIA litigation involving The New 
York Times’ and American Civil Liberties Union’s FOIA requests for 
copies of legal opinions and memorandum that articulated the legal 
determination and analysis of targeted killing, and more specifically, the 
targeted killing of U.S. citizens.135  Judge McMahon stated: 
The FOIA requests here in issue implicate serious issues 
about the limits on the power of the Executive Branch under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and about 
whether we are indeed a nation of laws, not of men.  The 
Administration has engaged in public discussion of the 
legality of targeted killing, even of citizens, but in cryptic and 
imprecise ways, generally without citing to any statute or 
court decision that justifies its conclusions.  More fulsome 
disclosure of the legal reasoning on which the Administration 
relies to justify the targeted killing of individuals, including 
United States citizens, far from any recognizable “hot” field 
of battle, would allow for intelligent discussion and 
assessment of a tactic that (like torture before it) remains 
hotly debated.  It might also help the public understand the 
scope of the ill-defined yet vast and seemingly ever-growing 
exercise in which we have engaged for well over a decade, at 
great cost in lives, treasure, and (at least in the minds of some) 
personal liberty. 
 
However, this Court is constrained by law, and under the law, 
I can only conclude that the Government has not violated 
FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the 
FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled by this court of 
law to explain in detail the reasons why its actions do not 
violate the Constitution and laws of the United States.  The 
Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost 
on me; but after careful and extensive consideration, I find 
myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot 
solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and 
rules—a veritable Catch-22.  I can find no way around the 
thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the 
Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly 
lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible 
with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for 
its conclusions a secret.  But under the law as I understand it 
to have developed, the Government’s motion for summary 
judgment must be granted…136 
 
 135 See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded to 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 136  Id. at 515-16. 
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Another reason for the complexity of classified FOIA exemptions is 
the subject matter expertise associated with classified information and 
national security harm.  Generally, courts accord substantial weight to a 
federal agency’s decision, as articulated in declarations, to classify and/
or withhold classified records.137  While E.O. 13526, section 1.4, 
identifies, with a fair degree of certainty, what types of information may 
be classified, the agency’s decision to classify specific information is not 
immune from litigation138 as there is always some level of subjectivity to 
classification determinations because they are generally based upon a 
future event and a risk assessment of that event’s impact to national 
security.139  Classified exemption cases are complex because the subject 
matter expertise resides with the federal agency and not within the 
judiciary: 
Because courts ‘lack the expertise necessary to second-guess 
such agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA 
case,’ we ‘must accord substantial weight to an agency’s 
affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the 
disputed record.’  If any agency’s affidavit describes the 
justifications for withholding the information with specific 
detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically 
falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by 
contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency’s 
bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis 
of the affidavit alone.  Moreover, a reviewing court ‘must 
take into account . . . that any affidavit or other agency 
statement of threatened harm to national security will always 
be speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a 
potential future harm.  ‘Ultimately, an agency’s justification 
for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears 
‘logical’ or plausible.’140 
One may question why the courts have applied this standard of 
“logical and plausible” or why the courts have given such deference to 
the federal government concerning classified information; however, the 
courts have explained this deference in various ways, but ultimately, it 
appears to be that the courts simply do not have the required expertise 
and one could say, do not want to acquire the expertise. 
a. “[I]n the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to 
executive affidavits predicting harm to national security, 
and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial 
review.”141 
 
 137  Id. at 551. 
 138  See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 857 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), aff’d, 715 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013), Amnesty Int’l USA v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Larson v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 139  Larson, 565 F.3d at 868.   
 140  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted).   
 141  Id. at 624 (citing Ctr. For Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 
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b. “The judiciary ‘is in an extremely poor position to 
second-guess the predictive judgments made by the 
government’s intelligence agencies regarding questions 
such as whether a country’s changed political climate has 
yet neutralized the risk of harm to national 
security. . .’”142 
 
c. “We ‘accord substantial weight to any agency’s affidavit 
concerning the details of  the classified status of the 
disputed record because the Executive departments 
responsible for national defense and foreign policy 
matters have unique insights into what adverse effects 
[sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified 
record.’”143 
 
d. If an agency’s statements are reasonably specific to show 
that the withheld information “logically falls within the 
claimed exemption and evidence in the record does not 
suggest otherwise . . . the court should not conduct a more 
detailed inquiry to test the agency’s judgment and 
expertise or to evaluate whether the court agrees with the 
agency’s opinions.”144 
 
e. “[C]ourts are generally ill-equipped to second-guess the 
Executive’s opinion in the national security context. . . . 
‘[W]e have consistently deferred to executive affidavits 
predicting harm to national security and have found it 
unwise to undertaking searching judicial review.’”145 
 
f. “It lies beyond the power of this Court to declassify a 
document that has been classified in accordance with 
proper procedures on the ground that the court does not 
think the information contained therein ought to be kept 
secret.  (‘[T]he text of Exemption 1 suggests that little 
proof or explanation is required beyond a plausible 
assertion that information is properly classified.’).”146 
In some cases, plaintiffs have requested that courts conduct an on-
camera review of the redacted records based upon their questions, 
concerns, and/or allegations of the agency’s determination that the 
information remain classified.  Some of the concerns include continued 
 
927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 142  Larsen, 565 F.3d at 865.   
 143  Id. at 864 (citing Ctr. For Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 
927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 144  Gov’t Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 699 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (2010) 
(citing Larsen v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 145  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted).  
 146  N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 560 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, remanded to 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014).   
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classification given the passage of time, the reasons noted in the 
affidavits/declarations are often repetitive or similar to past declarations 
(in prior cases), and/or the federal agency uses similar arguments/
statements concerning national security harm.  In effect, this argues that 
the federal agency has failed to faithfully consider each FOIA case on its 
own particular facts147 (i.e. a cookie-cutter approach by the federal 
agency), and thus the court is required to or should conduct a further or 
more detailed review of the redacted records.148  Again, the Larson Court 
stated that such requests for: 
further judicial inquiry [are] not required by–indeed is even 
contrary to–our precedent.  ‘Once satisfied that proper 
procedures have been followed and that the information 
logically falls from into the exemption claimed, the courts 
need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to 
question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue 
of good faith.’  Not only have we counseled that courts not 
go further, we have held that ‘the court is not to conduct a 
detailed inquiry’ if the agency’s statements meet the 
preliminary standard. . . . Plaintiffs [have] suggested that . . . 
the agencies do not faithfully consider FOIA requests but 
issue boilerplate responses, which should spur the court to 
require more explanation.  However, when the potential harm 
to national security in different cases is the same, it makes 
sense that the agency’s stated reasons for nondisclosure will 
be the same . . . the fact that similar exemption 
explanations . . . is not a cause for further judicial inquiry.149 
VIII. PROHIBITIONS ON CLASSIFYING SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF 
INFORMATION 
The Executive Order prohibits federal agencies from classifying, 
declassifying, or continuing the classification of records in any case in 
order to: conceal violations of law, inefficient, or administrative error; 
prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; restrain 
competition; or prevent or delay the release of information that does not 
require protection in the interest of the national security.150  Given these 
prohibitions, some FOIA requesters have recently argued that federal 
agencies have classified various documents/records in violation of these 
prohibitions and thus the documents may not be classified by the federal 
agency.151 
 
 147  Larsen, 565 F.3d at 868.   
 148  Id. at 867.   
 149  Id. at 869 (citations omitted). 
 150  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7.   
 151  See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 664 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 628 
F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  See also Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
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The critical question about these prohibitions is what if the classified 
record or information itself reveals a violation of law or is embarrassing 
to the USG and the very nature of release of the record/information would 
lead to harm to national security, including threats of international 
terrorism or threats against the U.S. military.  Does this mean that a 
federal agency cannot classify the record or maintain the classification of 
record?  Since September 11, 2001, the USG has defended a number of 
FOIA cases in which the plaintiff argued that because the underlying 
activity is illegal or unauthorized or no longer authorized, federal 
agencies cannot classify the information or the record loses its protection 
of classification.152  However, the fact that the conduct itself is unlawful, 
does not (in and of itself) preclude the possibility that the materials/
information/records may contain information of such a sensitive nature, 
the disclosure of which could (still) lead to national security harm.153 
One of the earlier court cases to address this issue was Lesar v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, where the FBI surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King 
exceeded the lawful limits.154 As noted by the Lesar Court, the FBI 
surveillance of Dr. King may have strayed beyond the bounds of its initial 
lawful security purpose.  However, this did not preclude the possibility 
that the actual surveillance records and the task force materials 
(investigation of the FBI’s surveillance) may nevertheless contain 
information of a sensitive nature.  The disclosure of this information 
could compromise legitimate secrecy needs.155 
The issue of illegal conduct was addressed more recently in Amnesty 
International, U.S. [hereinafter AI] v. CIA.156 President Obama (shortly 
after assuming office) had prohibited enhanced interrogation techniques 
[hereinafter EIT] (other than those that fell within the DA Field Manual) 
and directed the closure of Central Intelligence Agency [hereinafter CIA] 
detention facilities.  In this case, AI argued that the CIA records 
pertaining to past EITs (authorized but now prohibited) were outside of 
the CIA’s mandate and were not intelligence sources or methods.  The 
CIA withheld the records under both Exemption (b)(3)157 and (b)(1).  The 
AI Court found that the CIA had met its burden for withholding the 
 
 152  See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011), ACLU v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2013), ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2012), Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 
F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
156267 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2011)).   
 153  See Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (1980).   
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. at 483. 
 156  See Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 157  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. 
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records under both exemptions and rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments as 
to why the records were not or no longer classified and would not result 
in harm to the national security.158  The AI Court first noted that “‘[i]f an 
agency’s statements supporting exemption contain reasonable specificity 
of detail as to demonstrate that the withheld information logically falls 
within the claimed exemption and evidence in the record does not suggest 
otherwise . . . the court should not conduct a more detailed inquiry to test 
the agency’s judgment and expertise or to evaluate whether the court 
agrees with the agency’s opinions.’”159  In regards to the now prohibited 
EITs and detention facilities, the AI Court noted that AI, in effect, argued 
“that because some of the CIA’s techniques are illegal, the CIA therefore 
classified the documents to conceal the alleged illegality.”160  The court 
concluded that AI has only made this allegation or argument, and did not 
provide any support for its theory, stating: 
A finding of bad faith must be grounded in ‘evidence 
suggesting bad faith on the part of the [agency].  Ultimately, 
an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is 
sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.’” . . . [T]he fact 
that the interrogation methods may now be considered illegal 
does not mean that the information cannot be withheld 
pursuant to Exemption 1.161 
 In the end, the AI Court found that the federal government had met 
its burden for withholding the classified records.162 
The Washington D.C. Federal Courts have also adjudicated the issue 
of prohibited interrogation techniques in the case of ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Defense.163  In this case, the DoD partially denied the ACLU’s request 
for various records pertaining to fourteen high-value detainees held at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  In this case, the ACLU also argued that because 
President Obama had prohibited the EITs and closed the detention facility 
(at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), the DoD (and CIA) could no longer continue 
to classify the records.  The ACLU Court, like the AI Court, found that 
“[t]o the extent that the ACLU’s claim rests on the ACLU’s belief that 
enhanced interrogation techniques were illegal, there is no legal support 
for the conclusion that illegal activities cannot produce classified 
documents.  In fact, history teaches the opposite.  Documents concerning 
surveillance activities later deemed illegal may still produce information 
that may be properly withheld under exemption 1.”164 
 
 158  Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 159  Id. at 507-508. 
 160  Id. at 510-511. 
 161  Id. at 511. 
 162  Id. at 530. 
 163  See ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 164  Id. at 622 (citing Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).   
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In this particular case, the DoD (and CIA) articulated five harms to 
national security; the first four harms pertained to CIA techniques, 
priorities and foreign governments.  The fifth harm to national security 
was al Qaeda’s use of the information as propaganda.  It is interesting to 
note that the ACLU challenged the fifth basis as to whether one could use 
the records as propaganda and whether this propaganda use would 
(actually) harm national security.  The ACLU argued that the real reason 
the CIA had not released the records was because they would be 
embarrassing to the United States, and possibly reveal violations of law.  
And, because the Executive Order expressly prohibits the classification 
of records that would be embarrassing or reveal violations of law, the 
records cannot be withheld under the FOIA as classified records.165  The 
court chose not to decide the issue as to whether the information could be 
used as propaganda and whether the information could harm national 
security.  The court concluded the government’s four other reasons of 
national security harm were sufficient for non-release of the records as 
“[i]n the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to executive 
affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found it unwise 
to undertake searching judicial review.”166 
In another attempt to obtain information pertaining to EITs, the 
ACLU requested documents from the DoJ’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility as to whether any DoJ attorneys had “breached 
professional or ethical obligations in authorizing the use of enhanced 
interrogation techniques.”167  In this case, the ACLU did not argue that 
the EITs records could not be classified based upon President Obama’s 
prohibition of their use (although authorized at one time).  Instead, the 
ACLU argued that the EITs were “unlawful [from their first use] and 
therefore fall outside the protection of ‘intelligence sources and methods’ 
granted by those exemptions [(b)(1) and (b)(3)].”168  However, the court 
again concluded in favor of the USG and stated “[t]o the extent that the 
ACLU’s claim rests on the ACLU’s belief that the EIT were illegal, there 
is no legal support for the conclusion that illegal activities cannot produce 
classified documents.  In fact, history teaches the opposite.”169  The court 
noted that “[w]hile some of the documents shed light on the legality or 
 
 165  Id. at 624 (citing Exec. Order No. 12958, pt. 1, § 1.7, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825, (Apr. 20, 
1995)). 
 166  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Ctr. For Nat’l 
Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 167  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156267, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
The ACLU submitted its FOIA request on December 4, 2009. 
 168  Id. at *15. 
 169  Id. (citing ACLU v. U.S. DoD, 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); ACLU v. Dep’t of 
Defense, 723 F. Supp. 2d 621, 628-629 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).   
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illegality of the CIA’s conduct, the (b)(1) or (b)(3) claims are not pre-
textual.  Any possibility of illegal conduct on the part of the CIA does not 
defeat the validity of the exemptions claimed.”170  In other words, the 
Court found that the USG had provided a logical and plausible rationale 
for the redaction of the records as classified, and whether the actions were 
legal or illegal at the time and/or authorized or unauthorized at the time 
of classification was not in and of itself dispositive.171 
In yet another attempt to obtain records pertaining to EITs, the 
ACLU submitted a FOIA request for eleven reports from the CIA’s 
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) that pertained to the “detention, 
interrogation, or treatment of individuals apprehended after September 
11, 2001, and held at detention facilities outside the United States.”172  
The ACLU subsequently modified its FOIA request to “only 
‘descriptions in the OIG reports of the use of unauthorized interrogation 
methods.’”173  The CIA withheld the records under both Exemption (b)(1) 
and Exemption (b)(3)174 and the court (again) found that the CIA had met 
its burden for withholding the records under both exemptions.175  In this 
particular case, the ACLU again attempted to distinguish the FOIA 
request for the OIG records from the other cases by stating that the 
interrogation techniques were (both) illegal and unauthorized at the time 
of use (as opposed to illegal but authorized) and outside of the CIA’s 
mandate.176  The court rejects this argument, based upon Sims v. CIA,177 
and notes that “what matters is that the activity was conducted for 
intelligence purposes, not that it was illegal or unauthorized.”178  In 
addition, the fact that the activities are outside the charter of the CIA is 
“immaterial to the determination of whether they [the activities] fell 
under ‘intelligence sources or methods.’”179 
Classified information cases will never be easy as they pertain to 
“important issues arising at the intersection of the public’s opportunity to 
obtain information about their government’s activities and the legitimate 
 
 170  Id. (citing Agee v. C.I.A., 524 F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (D.C. Cir.1981)).  
 171  Id. 
 172  ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  The ACLU submitted its 
FOIA request on April 25, 2011. 
 173  ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241 240 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 174  As noted by the court, the analysis of “intelligence sources and methods” under 
exemption (b)(1) and (b)(3), statutory exemptions, are routinely the same.  ACLU v. CIA, 
892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 736-737, 
n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 175  Id. at 245.   
 176  Id.  
 177  See Sims v. CIA, 471 U.S. 1159 (1985). 
 178  ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 244 (citing Sims v. CIA, 471 U.S. 1159 (1985)). 
 179  Id. at 245 (citing Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269, 273-274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).  
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interests of the Executive Branch in maintaining secrecy about matters of 
national security.”180   
However, what is clear is that FOIA requesters appear to think that 
just because the information reveals an illegal action (or the action is or 
was prohibited and/or unauthorized) or is embarrassing to the USG, that 
fact in and of itself prohibits the government from classifying records.  
This narrow construction or interpretation of E.O. 13526 is simply not 
logical.  The logical interpretation of E.O. 13526 is that the information 
cannot be classified based only upon or for the sole purpose of concealing 
violations of law, inefficiencies or administrative error; preventing 
embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; restraining 
competition; or preventing or delaying the release of information that 
does not require protection in the interest of the national security.181  This 
is the only conclusion that makes sense, at least from a national security 
perspective. 
It is interesting to note that there is one recent FOIA litigation case 
where records were not classified and withheld under exemption (b)(1) 
but rather withheld only under (b)(6) and (b)(7).  This case involved an 
ACLU FOIA request, submitted to the DoD on October 7, 2003, for 
various photographs of detainee abuses.182  The ACLU subsequently filed 
suit against the DoD and other federal agencies on June 2, 2004, and the 
litigation continued for over ten years.183  It is unclear why DoD only 
claimed exemption (b)(6), personal privacy interests, and (b)(7)(C), law 
enforcement records and personal privacy interests, as authority for 
withholding the photographs and did not claim exemption (b)(1), use as 
propaganda and harm to national security.184  While some may disagree, 
a strong argument exists that such photographs could be classified 
pursuant to exemption (b)(1) based upon national security harm to the 
United States, its citizens and residents, to the DoD, and more specifically 
to military members and/or units or installations.  Given the recent attacks 
(or threats of attacks) against military service members and their families, 
military installations and/or recruiting stations, etc. both in the United 
States and in United States Central Command’s [hereinafter 
CENTCOM’s] area of responsibility [hereinafter AoR], the harm to 
national security is real.  Examples of attacks or threats of attacks include 
 
 180  N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 181  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7.  
182   See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, ACLU v. DoJ, 681 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 183  See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 40 F. Supp. 3d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).   
 184  The Dep’t of Defense also argued (b)(7)(F) as a basis for withholding the photographs; 
however, the court also rejected exemption (b)(7)(F) as a basis for withholding the 
photographs.  See, ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 389 F. Supp. 2d. 547, 568-579 (2005). 
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the following: 
a. Two American service members were killed by an 
Afghanistan soldier  in a series of deaths based upon anti-
Americanism as a result of the burning of Korans by U.S. 
soldiers.185 
 
b. An Afghanistan police officer opened fire on U.S. and 
Afghanistan forces, killing two U.S. service members and 
three Afghanistan police officers.186 
 
c. As noted by Representative Peter King of New York, 
“People in uniform are symbols of the United States.  
They’re symbols of American might . . . And if they 
(military personnel) can be killed, that is a great 
propaganda victory for Al Qaeda.”187 
 
d. The Cyber Caliphate, an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) affiliated hacker group, hijacked the Twitter 
Account of Military Spouses of Strength188 to post 
“Creepy threats against members of the group.”189 
 
e. The CENTCOM’s Twitter account was also recently 
hacked by supporters of ISIS or the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Levant (ISIL), and the hackers posted the following 
messages:  “AMERICAN SOLDIERS, WE ARE 
COMING, WATCH YOU BACK. You’ll see no mercy 
infidels.  ISIS is already here, we are in your PCs, in each 
military base.  With Allah’s permission we are in 
CENTCOM now.  We won’t stop!  We know everything 
about your wives and children.  U.S. Soldiers!  We’re 
watching you!”190 
The propaganda value by extremists concerning successful attacks 
 
 185  2 US Troops Killed in Afghanistan Following Koran Burning, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/03/01/2-troops-killed-by-
afghan-soldier-civilian/. 
 186  Afghan Police Officer Reportedly Fills 2 US Troops, 3 Afghans in ‘Insider’ Attack, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/11/afghan-
police-officer-allegedly-kills-2-us-troops.  This attack occurred two days after a deadline set 
by President Karzai for U.S. Special Forces to withdraw from the area following allegations 
of abuse.   
 187  Catherine Herridge, Military a Growing Terrorist Target, Lawmakers Warn, FOX 
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/06/military-growing-
terrorist-target-lawmakers-warn/.   
 188  A group that “aims to improve mental health awareness by providing resources and 
knowledge through tangible programing.”  See John Hayward, ISIS-Aligned ‘Cyber 
Caliphate’ Hacker Go After Military Spouses of Strength, ABQ JOURNAL (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/11/isis-aligned-cybercaliphate-hackers-
go-after-military-spouses-of-strength/.   
 189  Id.   
 190  Caitlin Dickson, U.S. Military Command’s Twitter Account Hacked, YAHOO NEWS 
(Jan. 12, 2015, 1:17 P.M.), http://news.yahoo.com/u-s—military-command-s-twitter-
account-apparently-hacked-by-isis-181757697.html.  
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against the United States, DoD, and U.S. military members and/or their 
families (whether the misconduct is substantiated or not) is real.  While 
the articles cited above originated a number of years after the 2004 ACLU 
FOIA litigation for the release of the photographs (and could explain why 
DoD did not assert exemption (b)(1)), the harm to military members and 
their families, installations, U.S. citizens, and the United States is real and 
not simply speculative.  This harm and risk of harm must be considered 
in future litigations from the perspective of national security harm, as 
defined by E.O. 13526. 
IX.  WAIVER OF CLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION – OTHERWISE KNOWN 
AS THE WIKILEAKS ARGUMENTS 
A FOIA requester may compel a federal agency to release otherwise 
classified information or records if the federal agency has “officially 
acknowledged” the information/record and thus has waived its ability to 
claim the exemption.191  In some cases, FOIA requesters will argue that 
because the record or information is already publicly available 
(sometimes citing various internet sites or news reports), the federal 
agency cannot now claim that the information is classified.192 
For waiver cases, FOIA requesters have the burden of establishing 
that the federal agency has “officially acknowledged” the information/
record.193  In addition, E.O. 13526 clearly states, “[c]lassified information 
shall not be automatically declassified as a result of any unauthorized 
disclosure of identical or similar information . . .”194  Courts have 
examined the issue of official release and have articled the following 
three-prong test: 
Classified information ‘is deemed to have been officially 
disclosed only if it (1) “[is] as specific as the information 
previously released,” (2) “match[es] the information 
previously disclosed,” and (3) was “made public through an 
official and documented disclosure.”  As to the last factor, 
“the law will not infer official disclosure of information 
classified by the CIA from (1) widespread public discussion 
of a classified matter, (2) statements made by a person not 
authorized to speak for the Agency, or (3) release of 
information by another agency, or even by Congress.” . . . 
Indeed, “the fact that the government disclosed general 
information on its interrogation program does not require full 
 
 191  See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
 192  See e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Amnesty Int’l, 
U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).   
 193  See e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Billington v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 11 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 233 
F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2000), Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).   
 194  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.1(b)(2)b.   
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disclosure of aspects of the program that remain 
classified.”‘195 
The court further noted that “[a]n agency’s official acknowledgment 
of information . . . cannot be based on mere public speculation, no matter 
how widespread.”196  Another court phrased it as follows:  There is “‘a 
critical difference between official and unofficial disclosures,’ and the 
mere ‘fact that information exists in some form in the public domain does 
not necessarily mean that official disclosure will not cause [cognizable] 
harm.’”197  In the case of documents available because of a WikiLeaks 
disclosure, this particular court went on to say that it was simply no 
substitute for an “official acknowledgement.”198 
It should be clear that case law is consistent with E.O. 13526’s 
statement that “[c]lassified information shall not be declassified 
automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or 
similar information.”199  Will this clear language within case law and in 
the current Executive Order stop those from arguing before a court that 
the information is already available to the public and does not require the 
continued classification by the federal agency?  As with the new 
E.O. 13556200 and the premise that it will clear up confusion between CUI 
and releases under the FOIA, this author is skeptical that FOIA requesters 
will cease citing WikiLeaks (and now Edward Snowden) as a basis for 
discontinued classification of information or records.  This skepticism is 
based upon the fact that the ACLU argued a leaked report by the 
International Red Cross as the basis for declassification of records and/or 
questioned the continued need for the classification of records pertaining 
to fourteen high value detainees.201 
X.  SUMMARY 
As noted in the beginning of this article, Congress believed it had 
achieved a workable solution or balance between the public’s right to 
know and/or right of access to government records and the USG’s need 
to protect itself and its citizens.  However, on September 11, 2001, the 
United States was attacked on its own soil and this had not happened 
since December 7, 1941, the day Pearl Harbor was attacked.  The tension 
 
 195  Amnesty Int’l U.S., 728 F. Supp. 2d at 508-509 (citing ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
664 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).  
 196  Id. at 512 (citing Wolf v. CIA 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 197  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 223-224, (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted). 
 198  Id. at 223-24 (citing Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 199  Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.1(c). 
 200  75 Fed. Reg. 68,675 (Nov. 9, 2010). 
 201  ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 664 F. Supp. 2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
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that existed between access to government records and national security 
interests (whether they are classified or sensitive but unclassified 
information) is even more apparent since that fateful day of September 
11, 2001.  National security concerns are somewhat speculative (as they 
are based upon a future event as noted by the Larsen Court202); however, 
they are also real.  As it has been said (in terms of protecting the United 
States), we, the United States, have to be right all the time, while those 
that wish to harm the United States only need to be right once.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that FOIA litigation pertaining to national security 
interests will continue now and into the future.  When writing this Article, 
the author was drawn to a statement made by Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein 
in the early stages of the FOIA litigation involving various records related 
to the detainees under the custody of the United States (discussed 
above).203  Judge Hellerstein wrote the following: 
My inquiry with respect to the documents in issue is 
particularly acute.  Our nation has been at war with terrorists 
since their September 11, 2001 suicide crashes into the World 
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, killing thousands and wounding our nation in 
ways that we still cannot fully recount – indeed, we were at 
war with terrorists since well before that event.  American 
soldiers are fighting and dying daily in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The morale of our nation is a vital concern and directly affects 
the welfare of our soldiers.  How then to deal with the 
commands of FOIA and the strong policy it reflects ‘to 
promote honest and open government,’ to assure the 
existence of an informed citizenry,’ and ‘to hold the 
governors accountable to the governed’?  Of course, national 
security and the safety and integrity of our soldiers, military 
and intelligence operations are not to be compromised, but is 
our nation better preserved by trying to squelch relevant 
documents that otherwise would be produced for fear of 
retaliation by an enemy that needs no pretext to attack?  FOIA 
places a heavy responsibility on the judge to determine ‘de 
novo’ if documents withheld by an agency are properly 
withheld under an exemption and, if necessary, to examine 
the withheld documents ‘in camera’. . . .204 
Most individuals would agree with Judge Hellerstein’s comment 
that the FOIA has placed a heavy responsibility upon judges who have to 
determine, de novo, whether classified records should be released over a 
federal agency’s objections.  In addition and to a certain extent, Judge 
Hellerstein’s comment is that the USG’s enemy, since September 11, 
2001, does not need a pretext to attack.  However, this author would go 
one step further and ask one additional question: Do we need to give the 
 
 202  Larson, 565 F.3d at 857.   
 203  See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 204  Id. at 550. 
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enemy an excuse to attack the United States or use government 
information/records as propaganda to encourage those to attack the 
United States, be it from within the United States or outside of the United 
States?  In other words, how many U.S. service members’ lives (or U.S. 
citizens or residents) are worth release of this information?  In his 
discussion on the need for openness versus secrecy and national security, 
Judge Hellerstein wrote “[h]istorians will evaluate, and legislators 
debate, how wise it is for a society to give such regard to secrecy.”205  
However, in the end, this Article concludes that it will be historians, 
legislators, theologians and philosophers who will debate how wise it is 
for a society to give such regard to openness and whether that value is 
greater or was greater than the lives lost as a result of that release or 
openness. 
 
 
 205  Id. at 562. 
